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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, NORTHERN DIVISION 
HIRAM G. HILL, JR. , ) 
ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER and 
DONALD S. COHEN, ) 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
) CIVIL ACTION 
) NO. CIV 3-71-48 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS IN SUPPORT 
OF NOTION FOR TENPORARY INJUNCTION 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISNISS 
The plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Injunctive 
Relief on Wednesday, February 18, 1976, seeking a temporary and , 
permanent injunction with regard to the defendant's continuation 
of work and construction activity on the Tellico Darn and Tellico 
Project. Of immediate concern, along with the construction 
activity on the Tellico Darn, is the extensive bull-dozing and 
clear-cutting of trees, logs and foliage presently being carried 
I 
on by the defendant along the banks of the Little Tennessee j 
Rlver. This action has been filed pursuant to the Endangered l 
Species Act U6 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543) (1973), and hai as its prirnary1 
purpose the preservation and protection of the Snail Darter, 
scientifically known as Percina (Irnostorna) tanasi. As the Court 
knows, the Sn~il Darter has been designated an endangeied 
species pursuant to said statutory provisions. In making this 
determination, the Secretary of the Interior indicated that such 
was made after extensive study and analysis and was based upon 
the "best scientific and commercial data available", as required 
I 
I; 
by 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1). As clearly indicated in the Endangerep 
Species Act, and specifically pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (g) 
(1), the district courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctions 
to enjoin any person, including United State.s and any other govern 
mental instrumentality, who is alleged to be in violation of 
any provisions of the Act. The plaintiffs are prepared to sho~, 
and the Secretary of Interior' s· determination so indicates, 
that the actions of TVA in engaging in said bull-dozing and 
clear-cutting, as well as the continued construction activity 
on the Tellico Dam is in violation of, and will further violate, 
the Act's requirements in connection with the endangered species. 
The Court should take note of the fact that TVA vigorously 
fought the listing of the Snail Darter as an endangered species 
and tried to take the position in its comments to the Secretary 
of the Interior that, among other things, the Snail Darter 
existed elsewhere and was not properly an endangered species. 
The defendant TVA has, in essence, been shown to be incorrect with 
regard to their previous positions. 
Suffice it to say in brief, the Complaint filed by. 
the plaintiffs clearly provides a basis for temporary injunctive 
relief in this cause. The plaintiffs, in addition, 'are prepared 
to present testimony and evidence at the preliminary injunction 
hearing scheduled for Wednesday, February 25, 1976, in support 
of the positions set forth in the Complaint. 
A. STATUTORY NOTICE. 
The defendant TVA has filed a Motion to Dismiss 
setting forth one ground, namely, that the Court lacks jurisdic-
tion because the plaintiffs have allegedly failed to comply with 
the statutory notice requirements. The plaintiffs will at this 
time respond to said Motion and, in general, to the brief filed 
by the defendant. 
The initial point presented by the defendant is 
that the plaintiffs have failed to comply with the 60-day written 
notice requirement. The first point presented by the defendant 
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is that: "First, the Complaint does not allege that notice of 
the violation was given to the Secretary of the Interior as 
required by the Act." This point is clearly erroneous as noted 
by paragraph 12 of the Complaint which states as follows: 
"On or about October 20, 1975, the plaintiffs . gave the 
requisite notice of violation to the Secretary of the Interior 
and to the violator, the defendant herein, Tennessee Valley 
Authority." 
The defendant next responds that the Snail Darter 
was not officially listed as an endangered species at the time 
the alleged notice to TVA was given. In response thereto, the 
plaintiffs would refer the Court to 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (g)(l) and 
(2), which indicates that the 60-day written notice requirement 
is more, in reality, an issue of standing rather than jurisdiction 
per se. First of all, it is clear that there is no precise 
requirement that the statutory notice only be given after the 
final and effective date of the Endangered Species Listing. In 
this situation, we have the Secretary of Interior•s determination 
and the listing of the Snail Darter as an endangered species 
published in the Federal Register on or about October 9, 1975. 
Said listing does state therein that the amendment will be 
effective on November 10, 1975. Plaintiffs contend that the 
key concern with the statutory notice is actual notice to the 
violator and the Secretary of the Interior and not some rigid 
hypertechnical notice consideration which is unrealistic in 
the intent and purpose of the statute. A corollary to this 
·I proposition is demonstrated by National Wildlife Federation 
I v. William T. Coleman, U. S. District Court, Southern District 
of Mississippi, opinion filed August 4, 1975, wherein the Court 
in discussing this notice aspect under the Endangered Species 
Act, states as follows: 
On March 21, 1975, the plaintiff, National 
Wildlife Federation, wrote to the defendant, 
Tiemann, expressing its opposition to the 
project and alleging violations of both 
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Section 7 of the 
Endangered Specie
s Act and 
Section 4(f) of the D
epartment of Tran
sport-
ation Act. (Exhibit 
FD-1(39)) Copies of 
that letter were 
sent to three dif
ferent 
offices within th
e Department of 
the 
Interior. It is 
true, as the Fede
ral de-
fendants argue, t
hat this letter 
does not 
specifically purp
ort to be the not
ice re-
quired by 16 U.S.
C. § 1540(g), but th
is 
section does not 
require the notic
e to be in 
any particular fo
rm. The Court is
 convinced 
that the letter o
f March 21 was su
fficient 
to place the Sec
retary of Interio
r on notice 
of the alleged vi
olations of Secti
on 7. 
II 
II 
I! 
!j 
/i It is interesti
ng to note that 
this case involve
d the Endangered 
p 
I 
rSpecies Act and 
its application t
o a request to h
alt construction 
1 
of a.segment of I
nterstate Highwa
y 10 through the 
habitat of 
II the Mississippi Sandhill Cra
ne in Jackson Cou
nty, Mississippi. 
II II It seems c
lear that the im
portant concern o
f the 
r .i statutory notice provis
ion relates to a
ctual notice to t
he 
!I I Secretary of the Inte
rior and the alle
ged violator prio
r to the 
institution of an
 action so that 
conceivably certa
in informal 
il or administrative action 
can be effectivel
y taken prior to
 the 
It is interesting
 to note that in 
II 
·' institution of 
any suit. 
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the instant case 
the defendant TVA
 responded to the
 written 
notice of the pl
aintiffs of Octob
er 20, 1975, by a 
letter di~ecte 
to them bearing d
ate of October 28
, 1975, a xerox c
opy of which 
is attached heret
o as Exhibit 1. 
Under the circum
stances it 
seems somew
hat absurd for th
e defendant TVA t
o raise this 
argument. 
The notice of Oc
tober 20, 1975, fo
rwarded by the 
II 
!1 plain tiffs was 
clearly anticipat
ory and subseque
nt to the actua. 
ll 
II 
I 
! 
th~ Federal Regist
er on October 9, 
1975. Nothi1 
publication in 
further was requ
ired for the fina
l effectiveness o
f the listing 
I of November 10, 1975. Secondly, the vio
lation involved,. 
the 
I' continued construction of th
e Tellico Dam and
 Tellico Project 
,I 
I
I/ was not a me
re wisp in the ai
r as might be occ
asioned by air 
See West Penn Pow
er Co. v. Train, 
378 F.Supp. 941 (H.D
.Pa. 197 1 
1
' pollution of on
e sort or anot
her occurring on 
one occasion. I H 
we have the dram
atic continuation
 of a project which th
e plain 
' ii contend will necessarily, by it
s conclusion, re
nder the Snail 
!I 
!i - 4 -
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Darter extinct .and has and will clearly violate the Endangered 
Species Act. 
In addition, this is not something new and strange. 
The matter of the ~ellico Dam and Tellico Project during the 
period 1973 through 1975, 1973 being the date of discovery of 
the Snail Darter, was clear and continuing and the question of 
the possible violation of the Endangered Species Act by TVA 
I
' with respect to the Snail Darter and the Tellico Project had been 
debated extensively between the parties and by written comments 
.I 
before the Secretary of the Interior. 
The defendant cites the case of West Penn Power 
Company v. Train, 378 F.Supp. 941 (Western Dist. Pa. 1974), aff'd 
522 F.2d, 302 (3d Cir. 1975), for the proposition that failure 
to give such notice requires a dismissal of the action. However, 
apparently 
in that case, there/was no notice given at all. The plaintiffs 
contend that they did comply with the notice requirement of the 
statute. Their notice of October 20, 1975, specifically stat~d 
therein that it was intended as notice under the statute. 
B. THERE IS NO IMPLIED EXEMPTION FOR ONGOING PROJECTS. 
Further, the argument that the Endangered Species 
Act contains an implied exemptionfor ongoing projects has no 
merit. The statute on its face is clear, with a mandatory 
application to all Federal actions. There is no grandfather 
clause or other exemption for projects that are underway at the 
time of the Act. Many Federal projects are funded and commenced 
many years before their completion and to imply exemption for 
such projects would, in large part, emasculate the Act and thwart 
its policies and purposes. This clear reading of the statute is 
supported by administrative interpretation by the leading 
Federal agency,- and by the courts. The Department of Interior 
has interpreted § 1536 as fully applicable to Federal actions 
which were planned or partially completed prior to enactment of 
the 1973 Act. Hood, § 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: 
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A Significant 
Restriction fo
r all Federal A
ctivities, 5 ELR
 50189, 
50196 (1975), citi
ng letter of J
une 6, 1975, fr
om Department 
of 
Interior to De
partment of Tra
nsportation. S
ince Interior i
s 
primarily resp
onsible for en
forcing the Ac
t, that Departm
ent's 
endorsement of 
application of
 the Act to on
going projects is 
entitled to co
nsiderable judicial
 deference. Udall 
v. Tallman, 
381 U.S. l, 16 
(1965). Furthermo
re, in cases in
volving the 
Endangered Spe
cies Act, the A
ct has been app
lied to ongoing
 
projects by the Co
tirts. In U.S. 
vs. Cappaert, 
508 F.2d 313 
(9th Cir. 1974), w
hich involved t
he Devil's Hol
e Pupfish, a 
two-inch fish w
hich lives exc
lusively in an 
underground ca
vern 
in Death Valle
y National Mon
ument, the cou
rt enjoined continu
ed 
pumping for irr
igation which 
was lowering t
he critical wa
ter 
table of the fi
sh. The ongoi
ng activities 
involvedamdtim
illion 
dollar investm
ent and vested 
private proper
ty rights as w
ell 
as Federal acti
on. In Nation
al Wildlife Fe
deration v. Col
eman, 
(Civil Action No. 
J 75-129) (SD Miss
. August 4, 19
75), the tria] 
court was pres
ented with ·a 
. petition to e
njoin highway const
ru( 
tion through th
e only known n
esting area of
 the Mississip
pi 
Sandhill Crane
, an endangered
 species. The 
District Court'
 
refused to gra
nt an injunction o
n the basis th
at plaintiffs 
the Court 
had not. shown h
armful· effect 
on the species
, and/ did not h
esit< 
r· 
to consider ap
plication.of th
e Act to the p
roject on the groun
 
that it was an
 ongoing project. 
Further, that 
case is now on
 
appeal to the 
Fifth Circuit, 
and a temporary
 injunction has bf 
granted pending
 a determinatio
n on the merit
s. 
Finally, the a
llegation that 
the Endangered 
Spe 
Act contains a
n implied exem
ption for ongoi
ng projects is 
refuted by the 
reasming of thi
s Court in th
e NEPA litigati
on 
over the Tellic
o Project. This C
ourt stated, "[T]h
e omissio1 
of the traditio
nal grandfathe
r clause in [the 
subject Act] a 
as the Act's s
tress on the in
clusive applic
ability of the 
policy promulg
ated by the Act
 indicates a s
trong legislati
v( 
intent to impl
y [the Act] to [o
ngoing] Federal a
ction ... 
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II 
and, citing M
orningside-Leno
x Park Assn. v
. Volpe, 334 
F.Supp. 
132 (ND Pa. 1971)
 this Court state
d that applica
tion of the Ac
t 
" ...
 is required a
s to an ongoin
g Federal pro
ject on which sub-
stantial actio
ns are yet to
 be taken, reg
ardless of the
 date of 
'critical' Fed
eral approval 
of the project." 
EDF v. TVA, 33
9 
F.Supp. 806, 8
11, 812 (ED Tenn.
 1972). The Cou
rt of Appeals 
supported this
 Court, statin
g that "we be
lieve it more 
consonant 
with Congress
ional intent t
o hold that an
 agency must 
[comply 
with the relev
ant statute) when
ever the agenc
y intends to t
ake 
steps that wi
ll result in a
 significant 
envl:ronmental 
impact, 
whether or no
t those steps 
were planned b
efore [the effec
tive 
date of the Ac
t) and whether or
 not the propo
sed steps repr
esent 
simply the las
t phase of an 
integrated ope
ration most of
 which 
was completed 
before that da
te." EDF v. T
VA, 468 F.2d 1
164, 1177 
(6th Cir. 1972). 
C. NO EXEMPTI
ON IMPLIED BY 
CONTINUED CONG
RESSIONAL APPR
OPRIATro; 
Further, no ex
emption can be
 implied to th
e Act 
I based upon the fact of
 continued app
ropriations, o
r continued 
appropriation 
for the speci
fic project. The 
proposition th
at 
such an exemp
tion is implie
d for ongoing 
projects where Con
gres 
continues to a
ppropriate fun
ds for a chall
enged project is 
str( 
ly rejected in EDF
 v. Froehlke, 
473 F.2d 346 (8th
 Cir. 1972), 
where the Cou
rt held that H
ouse Rule XXI 
specifically p
revente 
' such an argum
ent. House Ru
le XXI is spec
ific in provid
ing tho 
in the case of
 appropriation
 bills, "2. N
o appropriatio
n shaJ 
be reported in
 any general a
ppropriation b
ill, ... Nor
 shal. 
any provision 
in any such bi
ll or amendmen
t thereto chan
ging 
existing law b
e in order, 
II (Emphasis added.)
 See 473 
F.2d 346, 354.
 "An appropr
iation act can
not serve as
 a vehic 
to change that
 requirement 
[that a project be
 completed in 
accordance wit
h applicable F
ederal law)", ED
F v. Froehlke,
 
473 F.2d 346, 
353. 
·-
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In CNR v. Seaberg, 463 F.2d 783, (DC Cir. 1971), 
the Court found that continued funding of AEC tests did not void 
the need to comply with applicable Federal law. 11 Congress 
must be· free to provide authorization and appropriations for pro-
jects proposed by th~ executive even though claims of illegality 
on grounds of compliance with NEPA [the applicable law in that 
case] are pending in the courts. There is, of course, nothing 
inconsistent .with adoption of appropriations and authorizations 
measures on the pro tanto exemption of validity, while leaving 
any claim of invalidity to be determined by the court~.~~ 
CNR v. Seaberg, 463 F.2d 783, 785. 
Finally, in the NEPA case involving the Tellico 
Project the Sixth Circuit Court specifically stated that 11 [W]e are 
unimpressed with appellant's argument that Congress authorized 
appropriations for Tellico in 1970 and 1971, even though environ-
mental impact statements had not been filed. To paraphrase Mr. 
Justice Douglas, 'Congress did not intend, by approving 
funds for the [Tellico Project] to repeal NEPA as it applied 
to the [Project] . . . ' Other Federal courts have similarly 
concluded that Congressional appropriations for a project subject 
to NEPA are not to be taken as expressing any view with respect 
to compliance with NEPA." (Citations omitted]. EDF v. TVA, 
468 F.2d 1164, 1182 (6th Cir. 1972). 
Defendants have alleged that conver.sations in the . 
House Appropriations Committee constituted a specific exemption 
for the Tellico Project. This argument has no merit. First, the 
potential conflict between the Project and the Act was only 
mentioned in the course of committee discussions. It was never 
reported to Congress in floor debates, in the official House Report 
on the appropriations bill, and, therefore, Congress could not 
even have considered the question in passing the appropriations 
bill. To argue that such occurrences constitute a Congressional 
amendment of the Endangered Species Act would be to invite 
legislation by subterfuge, by permitting implication of statutory 
immunity for any potential project litigation mentioned in the 
course of a committee discussion. 
- 8 -
The cases cited above directly support this conclu-
sion. Appropriations bills cannot be held to create implied 
amendments to prior Federal statutes, at the very least not in 
I 
/ the absence of some specific reference to the statutory conflict 
I by Congress. Finally, it is to be noted that the alleged conver-
sations took place in April and March of 1975, seven months 
prior to the effective date of the Snail Darter Listing, and, 
therefore, were essentially speculative since no statutory 
violation was possible until the Secretary had determined the 
applicability of the law. At the time of these conversations, 
moreover, the official position of TVA was that the Snail Darter 
I
I was not officially listed nor endangered and therefore that no 
violation of the Act existed. 
I 
I 
I! 
'I 
I 
~ffiNDATORY EFFECT OF SECTION 1536 
The Tennessee Valley Authority argues that the 
effect of § 1536 is merely to require consultation, instead of 
direct compliance with the Federal statute by Federal agencies. 
This argument fails to recognize that § 1536 is mandatory in 
its language, not only to consultation with the Secretary, but 
also actively "to insure that actions 
endangered species" etc-. 
do not jeopardize 
The penalty provisions of § 1538 apply to private 
parties; the only directive to Federal ~encies appears in § 1536 
and if TVA's argument were to prevail, it would mean that no 
Federal agency has to comply with the Act. Furthermore, § 1536 
does not "give a veto over any Federal project to the Secretary 
do 
of Interior." All the Secretary need/is list the species on 
the Endangered Species List. Beyond that it is the duty of ev~r 
Federal agency as well as the Department of Interior to comply 
with the Federal law. 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
On the basis of scientific fact and the findings 
of the Department of Interior, it appears clear that the Tellico 
() -
I 
.r ;;.~ 
~ 
I 
<I I; 
' 
ij 
II 
! 
Dam Project is in violation of the Federal Endangered Species 
Act. Pending a full hearing on the issuance of a permanent 
injunction, a temporary injunction must issue to support the 
strong and clear Congressional directives of the Act. Not to 
issue a temporary injunction would be to permit further irrepara-
ble destruction of the unique habitat of this endangered 
species, through continued destruction of the riverine environ-
quality 
ment, sediment-free water/and watershed conditions. Further, 
continued activity and expenditure on the Project poses the direct 
threat of irretrievable losses to the public and prejudices the 
ability of this Court to protect the public interest by a future 
The public interest would be best served 
I 
permanent injunction. 
by a temporary injunction at this time and a permanent injunction 
il thereafter. 
I; 
! Cessation of dam construction does not pose 
I! injuries to the public. 
li 
The citizens of Tennessee have success-
fully existed without a Tellico Dam for the past 200 years, and 
will not be threatened if the Dam is further delayed another 
200 years. The amount of money expended on the Project to date 
is largely retrievable to the direct benefit of the public; 
only a small portion i:s irretrievably sunk into the concrete and 
earthen construction work. The courts were not able to assess 
the economic costs and benefits of the Project in prior cases; 
under the provisions of the Endangered Species Act there is a 
substantive directive that the Act be enforced by all Federal 
agencies, and in pursuance of that mandate the injunction 
must issue. If any modification is to be made in the Endangered 
Species Act, it must be by Congress as the only body which can 
amend applicable Federal law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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